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RE-EXAMINING MOTIONS TO COMPEL
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS OF
SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMS
ORIANA MAZZAt

INTRODUCTION

Rape and sexual assault cases have caused controversy in
the courts for some time.' In the words of seventeenth century
British jurist Sir Matthew Hale, "[i]t must be remembered, that
[rape] is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved,
and harder to be defended by the party accused, though never so
innocent." 2 That Hale's words were once used as part of a jury
instruction 3 demonstrates that the legal complexity of this issue
has often led to tension between the rights of victims and
defendants. 4 Most victims of sexual assault are women; this fact
can bring about unique issues regarding the female psychology
and, more importantly, the male or societal understanding
thereof. 5 When the victim is a child, society may rashly deem
t J.D. Candidate, June 2008, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., 2004,
summa cum laude, St. John's University.
1 See Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the
Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11-20 (1977) (delineating the problems inherent for
women in the system).
2 Rice v. State, 217 N.W. 697, 699 (Wis. 1928) (quoting 1 SIR MATTHEW HALE,
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 634 (1678)); see also Wilcox v. State, 78 N.W. 763, 764 (Wis.
1899) ("Courts are therefore reluctant to sustain such convictions, unless the
testimony and surrounding circumstances are quite clear, and decisive of guilt.").
3 See Aviva Orenstein, No Bad Men!. A Feminist Analysis of CharacterEvidence
in Rape Trials, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 663, 664 n.1 (1998).
4 For an article concerning the same topic as this Note, from the opposite point
of view, see Judith Greenberg, Note, Compulsory Psychological Examination in
Sexual Offense Cases: Invasion of Privacy or Defendant's Right?, 58 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1257, 1257-58 (1990).
5 Amy M. Buddie & Arthur G. Miller, Beyond Rape Myths: A More Complex
View of Perceptions of Rape Victims, SEX ROLES: J. RES., Aug. 2001, at 1 ("Because
most rape victims are women, men feel different from this particular group of
victims and are thus more likely to endorse rape myths" such as the myth that there
are no rapes within marriages.); see also Tera Jckowski Peterson, Comment, Distrust
and Discovery: The Impending Debacle in Discovery of Rape Victims' Counseling
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him or her too immature to comprehend what has happened and
to tell the truth.6 Some defendants ask the courts to order
complainants in these cases to undergo psychiatric testing 7-- as
recommended by Dean Wigmore--so as to ascertain which
witnesses have filed charges "for purposes of blackmail and
revenge, or as a result of fantasy, or as symptoms of psychosis." 9
State caselaw is split as to whether a court can compel such
testing, and if so, under what circumstances. 10 The Supreme
Court is unlikely to decide this issue, having denied certiorari in
recent cases. 1 '
These examinations are justified as necessary to safeguard a
defendant's right to due process of law, 12 but they can also

Records in Utah, UTAH L. REV. 695, 706, 712-14 (2001) (discussing state laws
regarding the use of psychiatric records in discovery); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan,
Comment, Admitting Mental Health Evidence to Impeach the Credibilityof a Sexual
Assault Complainant,153 U. PA. L. REV. 1373, 1373 (2005) (noting the belief in some
circles that "some women falsely accuse men of rape because, either intentionally or
inadvertently, they have confused a sexual fantasy with a violent crime").
6 See In re Michael H., 602 S.E.2d 729, 734 (S.C. 2004) ("Cases involving child
victims present special concerns that weigh in favor of allowing judicial discretion to
order psychological evaluations."); Jeffrey P. Bloom, Post-Schumpert Era
Independent Interviews and Psychological Evaluations of Child Witnesses, 10 S.C.
LAW. 40, 42 (1998) (referring to child witnesses as a type of "evidence" that can
become "tainted" and thus should be examined by defense like any other piece of
evidence).
7 As the cases and scholarly articles cited throughout this piece vary on
terminology, this Note uses the terms "psychological" and "psychiatric"
interchangeably.
8 See Ballard v. Superior Court, 410 P.2d 838, 846 (Cal. 1966) ("A number of
leading authorities have suggested that in a case in which a defendant faces a
charge of a sex violation, the complaining witness, if her testimony is
uncorroborated, should be required to submit to a psychiatric examination." (citing 3
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 924a (1940))), superseded by statute, 1980 Cal. Stat. 63
(codified as amended at CAL. PENAL CODE § 1112 (West 2007)), as recognized in
People v. Haskett, 640 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1982).
9 State v. Maestas, 207 N.W.2d 699, 700 (Neb. 1973).
10This Note will frame the issue as between states that do allow motions to
compel psychological evaluations and states that do not, but the issue has been
framed differently by some courts. For example, there exists a judicial three-way
split between states that do not allow motions to compel psychological evaluations,
states that grant the defendant an absolute right to an evaluation of the witness,
and states that give trial judges discretion to grant the motion. See State v. Gregg,
602 P.2d 85, 88-91 (Kan. 1979).
11E.g., In re Michael H., 602 S.E.2d 729, 734 (S.C. 2004). At least one federal
court, however, has argued from other precedents relating to juveniles that it is
doubtful that the Supreme Court would approve of compulsory examination of child
victims. See Gilpin v. McCormick, 921 F.2d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1990).
12 See infra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
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seriously infringe on a complainant's rights. Even when victims
voluntarily seek post-rape counseling from mental health
professionals, if such persons voice doubt about the veracity of
their stories, victims are left feeling "violated and re-raped."' 13
These feelings are compounded when a victim is ordered to
undergo an examination at the bequest of the accused rapistbacked by a judge" 4 -for the sole purpose of determining
credibility.
This is especially disturbing because the system for these
examinations lacks sufficient protections for victims.
In a
traditional cross-examination, a witness is legally protected from
"questions which go beyond the bo[u]nds of proper crossexamination merely to harass, annoy or humiliate,"' 5 but no such
16
protection exists during a compulsory psychiatric examination.
This raises privacy concerns, exacerbated by the lack of doctorpatient confidentiality for court-ordered evaluations. 17 There are
also no guidelines for other protections that traditionally apply to
witnesses, such as the right to have counsel present and the right
to refuse to answer questions.1 8 These issues have even made
requesting the examinations an ethical problem for some
attorneys. 9
Despite these concerns, some jurisdictions provide that a
trial court has the power to order a complaining witness to
undergo a psychological examination in a criminal case. 20 They
13 Rebecca Campbell & Sheela Raja, Secondary Victimization of Rape Victims:
Insights from Mental Health Professionals Who Treat Survivors of Violence, 14
VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 3, 3 (1999), available at http://www.musc.edu/vawpreventionl

researchfvictimrape.shtml.
14 The judge generally does not have the power to force the complainant to
cooperate-only the power to order the examination-"but the ordinary witness does
not know this and will be fearful of refusing to do so." State v. Looney, 240 S.E.2d
612, 627 (N.C. 1978). The sanctions for not cooperating are severe, however, and
include being banned from testifying. Id.
15 Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 694 (1931).
16 See Looney, 240 S.E.2d at 626-27; J.G. Bangle & L.A. Haage, Comment,
Psychiatric Examinations of Sexual Assault Victims: A Reevaluation, 15 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 973, 986 (1982).
17 See Bangle & Haage, supra note 16, at 987 n.77.
18 See Looney, 240 S.E.2d at 626-27.
19 See Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5
HUM. RTS. 1, 6-7 (1975) (stating that invoking procedures to get a "rape victimf to
submit to a psychiatric examination" is an obligation that is "morally objectionable"
for some defense lawyers and something a lawyer might "thoroughly disapprove" in
other contexts).
20 See, e.g., Braham v. State, 571 P.2d 631, 640 (Alaska 1977) ("It is within the
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are typically requested and granted in sexual assault cases. 21 As
there is no brightline standard for when an examination may be
ordered, 22 the trial judge generally has discretion to grant a
motion for such an examination if the defendant demonstrates a
"compelling need"-for example, a lack of corroborating
evidence. 23 Because the standard at trial in most states is the
judge's discretion, the standard on appeal is customarily whether
the trial judge abused this discretion. 24 This is a difficult
25
standard to prove.
Despite the burden that defendants must shoulder to obtain
such an examination and the difficult reversal standard, other
states have nevertheless banned the practice. 26 These states
emphasize the victim's dignity and privacy rights and uphold
27
those rights as outweighing any benefit to criminal defendants.
discretion of the trial court whether to order a psychiatric examination of the mental
condition of a witness."); Koerschner v. State, 13 P.3d 451, 454 (Nev. 2000) (outlining
the power to compel child victims to submit to examination); Forbes v. State, 559
S.W.2d 318, 321 (Tenn. 1977) ("[I]n any case involving a sex violation, the trial judge
has the inherent power to compel a psychiatric or psychological examination of the
victim, where such examination is necessary to insure a just and orderly disposition
of the cause."); State v. Delaney, 417 S.E.2d 903, 906 (W. Va. 1992) ("[T]he decision
whether to require a psychiatric evaluation prior to determining a child's capacity to
testify is within the trial court's discretion."); Greenberg, supra note 4, at 1258
(supporting the view that the defendant should have the right to an evaluation of
the complainant at the trial court's discretion).
21 See Bangle & Haage, supra note 16, at 990; see also Ballard v. Superior
Court, 410 P.2d 838, 846 (Cal. 1966) ("The courts in this state, however, in cases not
involving sex violations, have rejected psychiatric testimony as to the mental or
emotional condition of a witness for purposes of impeachment."), superseded by
statute, 1980 Cal. Stat. 63 (codified as amended at CAL. PENAL CODE § 1112 (West
2007)), as recognized in People v. Haskett, 640 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1982).
22 The standards for granting an examination vary considerably. See infra text
accompanying notes 48-54.
23 See, e.g., Koerschner, 13 P.3d at 454.
24 See, e.g., Braham, 571 P.2d at 640 (finding no error).
25 See In re Michael H., 602 S.E.2d 729, 734 (S.C. 2004) ("[The] special concerns
[for compelling a witness to submit to the examination] weigh in favor of
complainants and thereby suggest judges would rarely order psychological
evaluations.").
26 See, e.g., State v. Looney, 240 S.E.2d 612, 626 (N.C. 1978) ("To require a
witness to submit to a psychiatric examination, by a psychiatrist not selected by the
witness, is much more than a handicap to the party .... It is a drastic invasion of
the witness' own right of privacy."); State ex rel. Holmes v. Lanford, 764 S.W.2d 593,
594 (Tex. 1989) (holding no compulsory examinations as to child victims); Nobrega v.
Commonwealth, 628 S.E.2d 922, 926 (Va. 2006) (holding that even a demonstration
of "compelling need" is not enough to overcome the complainants' privacy rights).
27 See State v. Horn, 446 S.E.2d 52, 53 (N.C. 1994); Looney, 240 S.E.2d at 626
(calling examinations "humiliating").
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Even California-which wrote the "seminal case" supporting
compulsory examination 2 8 -has statutorily banned the practice.
The 1966 case of Ballard v. Superior Court29 reasoned that a
compulsory evaluation was essential because:
[A] woman or a girl may falsely accuse a person of a sex crime
as a result of a mental condition that transforms into fantasy a
wishful biological urge. Such a charge may likewise flow from
an aggressive tendency directed to the person accused or from a
30
childish desire for notoriety.
This language represents an outdated and misogynistic way
of thinking-one that focuses on the victim, not the crime. The
case was ultimately superseded in 198131: California Penal Code
section 1112 reads, in pertinent part, that "the trial court shall
not order any prosecuting witness, complaining witness, or any
other witness, or victim in any sexual assault prosecution to
submit to a psychiatric or psychological examination for the
32
purpose of assessing his or her credibility."
This Note posits that there should be an analogous federal
statute-intended to inspire greater unanimity among statesforbidding federal courts from compelling complainants to
undergo psychiatric examinations in sexual assault cases,
whether the complainant is a child or an adult. Such a statute is
necessary because the practice not only deters the reporting of
sex crimes 3 3 and undermines the victim's right to privacy, 34 but
also because there is a lack of uniform standards across states. 35
A statute that addresses these issues by disallowing the practice
in the federal system would not abridge a defendant's rightsconstitutional or otherwise. 36 Moreover, like rape shield statutes
and similar laws, this ban would represent a positive social stride

28 See In re Michael H., 602 S.E.2d at 733 n.5.

29 410 P.2d 838 (Cal. 1966), superseded by statute, 1980 Cal. Stat. 63 (codified as
amended at CAL. PENAL CODE § 1112 (West 2007)), as recognized in People v.
Haskett, 640 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1982).
30 Id. at 846. When confronted with language like this, it is easy to see why the
case is no longer good law.
31 See People v. Anderson, 22 P.3d 347, 369 (Cal. 2001) (indicating that the
Ballardline of authority was superseded by statute).
32 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1112 (West 2007).
33 See infra Part I.B.
34 See infra Part I.C.
35 See infra Part I.A.
36 See infra Part II.
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against the negative and anachronistic views of sexual assault
37
victims inherent in compulsory psychological examinations.
Part I of this Note examines the necessity of the ban,
including an analysis of why various judicial tests and standards
currently in place are insufficient, a look at the deterrent effect of
compelled examination, and an explanation of how compulsory
psychological tests deny a victim's rights. Part II addresses the
concerns implicit in creating a federal statute comparable to that
enacted in California.
Such a statute would not abridge
defendants' rights because the court has no inherent power to
authorize examinations and -because the statute banning
compulsory examinations in federal courts would pass
constitutional muster. Such a ban, moreover, would fit into the
scheme of existing laws that protect sex-crime complainants and
witnesses. Ultimately, banning compulsory examinations would
help eliminate negative perceptions of sexual assault victims.
I.

NECESSITY OF THE BAN

A.

Lack of Unanimity

1.

Lack of Standards Led to Unjust Application in the Ballard
Era

Even in permitting compelled examinations in sexual assault
cases, the Ballard court noted some of the problems inherent in
the practice. 38
These included, among other things, a
psychiatrist
using unacceptable
techniques,
a partisan
psychiatrist clouding the issues, and an inordinate reliance by
39
jurors on the psychiatrist's assessment of witness credibility.
The court nonetheless believed that the possibility of "sympathyarousing" victims spinning believable tales-and subjecting
"unattractive"
defendants
to
undeserved
convictions4
0
outweighed these problems.
The court noted in dicta that
37 Rape shield statutes protect a victim's privacy by disallowing evidence of his
or her sexual history in a sexual assault case. See supra text accompanying notes
122-29.
38 See Ballard v. Superior Court, 410 P.2d 838, 846 (Cal. 1966), superseded by
statute, 1980 Cal. Stat. 63 (codified as amended at CAL. PENAL CODE § 1112 (West

2007)), as recognized in People v. Haskett, 640 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1982).
39 See id. at 848 n.10.
40

See id. at 846.

2008]

COMPELLING PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS

769

testimony of the psychiatrist-examiner was admissible not only
to impeach credibility, but also to resolve character issues; for
example, psychiatric character testimony could help to prove
consent if at issue in a rape case. 4 1 Ultimately, the court reached
what it considered a "middle ground," requiring defendants to
establish only two criteria to prevail on a motion to compel: lack
of corroborating evidence and the possibility that the
complainant's mental or emotional condition might affect her
42
credibility.
Considering the lenient standards set by the court, it comes
as no surprise that so-called "Ballard motions" were unevenly
and overinclusively applied in California. 43
Some counties
granted them more often than others, 44 sometimes compelling
examinations to assess witness credibility in cases where there
appeared to be corroborating evidence-for instance, where police
had witnessed the defendant on top of the victim in a bed while
holding a gun or in a bathroom stall unzipping a child victim's
pants. 45 Such cases demonstrate that the "compelling need"
standard, 46 in California at least, was not always construed by
trial judges in a logically-and morally-appropriate fashion. If
even those victims whose ordeals were witnessed by police
needed to have their stories "corroborated" through psychiatric
examinations, one can infer that California courts continued to
adhere to the groundless and anachronistic view that sex crime
victims are inherently unreliable.
2.

The Lack of Uniform Standards Across States Is Similarly
Problematic

Some states continue to use Ballard's "compelling need" as a
standard, 47 with the results often just as damaging as those in
41 See id. at 846 n.7. The Federal Rules of Evidence allow for evidence of a
witness's general character or specific acts that demonstrate character. FED. R.
EVID. 405.
42 See Ballard, 410 P.2d at 849.
43 See Bangle & Haage, supra note 16, at 981.
44 See id. at 981 n.42.
45 See id. at 981 n.46.
46 See Ballard, 410 P.2d at 849 ("[D]iscretion should repose in the trial judge to
order a psychiatric examination of the complaining witness in a case involving a sex
violation if the defendant presents a compelling reason for such an examination.").
47 See, e.g., Avery v. State, 129 P.3d 664, 671 (Nev. 2006) (citing lack of
corroboration and a reasonable basis for believing complainant's emotional state
affects her veracity as the elements of compelling need). These elements are nearly
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Ballard itself. Considering compelling need alone-without
taking into account victim-protective factors-subjugates a
victim. One of the Ballard elements is simply that the defense
question the effect of the victim's emotional or mental condition
upon her veracity; this element continues to be part of the test
for compulsory examination in some states. 48 It is clearly a very
low burden to meet, as all the defense needs to do is raise the
issue.
The other element-lack of corroborating evidence
supporting the victim's story 49-appears to be a more concrete
and just way to determine compelling need, yet it has not proven
as such in its application.
In fact, the lack of corroborating evidence standard has
proven as poor a barometer of necessity in recent years as it had
during the Ballard era. There are generally no strict guidelines
defining "corroborating evidence." In a 1999 case, the Court of
Appeals of Kansas favored a psychological examination of an
eleven-year-old victim, even though the trial court had found that
a medical examination showing injuries consistent with force to
vaginal and anal areas constituted corroborating evidence. 50 In
2003, however, another Kansas ruling held that a letter written
by a seven-year-old victim detailing sexual abuse could comprise
corroborating evidence. 5 1 And lack of corroborating evidence is
not only an imprecise standard, but an unnecessary one. Where
there is a true lack of such evidence, numerous safeguards
already protect the defendant-it would be difficult to get an
indictment at all, and if one is obtained, the jury should be
52
trusted to acquit.
Other courts consider different guidelines and methodswhich often vary considerably-in determining whether to order
examinations. In Arizona, for example, judges have sole and
"practically unlimited" discretion to decide whether children

identical to those found in Ballard.See supra text accompanying note 42.
48 See Koerschner v. State, 13 P.3d 451, 454 (Nev. 2000).
49 See, e.g., id. at 454; State v. Gregg, 602 P.2d 85, 91 (Kan. 1979).
50 See State v. Bourassa, 15 P.3d 835, 838, 843 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999).
51 See State v. Price, 61 P.3d 676, 679-80 (Kan. 2003). The letter written by the
child even stated "I lie sometimes and I am a big lying ratty big old pig. I ask God
very much to help me. I have bad problems with lying." Id. at 679.
52 See United States v. Dildy, 39 F.R.D. 340, 344 (D.D.C. 1966) ("If the
government presents a case without corroboration, the case fails. If the Government
is able to present corroboration, there is much less need for the mental
examination.").
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under the age of ten should be examined. 53 Other appellate
courts, however, have attempted to set firmer guidelines, the
realization of which would presumably eradicate problems such
as those that arose in California following Ballard.54 Some allow
court-ordered evaluations to stand if certain reasonableness
factors are met, including age of the complainant, remoteness in
time from the incident, degree of intrusiveness and humiliation,
physical effects, and "other relevant considerations." 55 Such tests
should be praised insofar as the reasonableness of granting the
evaluation is considered from the point of view of the victim's
well-being; but given the track record of courts when ordering
examinations, this test still seems too broad. Other tests are
even more flawed, arising out of a perspective disfavorable to the
victim, with elements such as whether the victim demonstrates
mental instability, whether the victim demonstrates a lack of
veracity, whether similar charges by the victim against others
are proven to be false, whether the defendant's motion for a
psychological evaluation of the victim appeared to be a fishing
expedition, whether anything unusual resulted following the
questioning of the victim's understanding of telling the truth,
and whether there are any other reasons why the victim should
be evaluated. 56 It is troubling that different courts can have
completely different approaches, some far less considerate
towards victims than others. This broad spectrum means that
victims in some states arbitrarily suffer more for their choice to
report and prosecute sex offenses.
A ban on compulsory
examinations in the federal courts would serve as an example for
the states and encourage them to adopt similar measures.
B. Deterrent Effect
The reason that the lack of national unanimity is such a
critical issue is that allowing compulsory examination deters
victims from reporting sex crimes; a federal ban would instill
awareness in sex victims that their rights are highly valued,
53 See State v. Jerousek, 590 P.2d 1366, 1371 (Ariz. 1979). In one case, the judge
and attorneys for both sides questioned the child in the judge's chambers, and it was
on this basis that the judge made the decision whether to order an examination. Id.
Although in that case an examination was not ordered, it is troubling that a judge,
someone untrained in psychology, could have that much power.
54 See supra Part I.A.1.
55 See State v. Ramos, 553 A.2d 1059, 1062 (R.I. 1989).
56 See Price,61 P.3d at 681-82.
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making them less hesitant to come forward. 57 Laws are intended
to deter criminals, 58 but they can certainly deter victims as well;
this is especially true with crimes like sexual assault, where the
victim often faces a considerable amount of scrutiny, feeling like
he or she has been "put on trial."59 Not surprisingly, scholars
have called the prosecution of a sex crime a "second assault" of a
victim. 60 Some courts reason that victims-especially childrenwill not be deterred by the possibility of having to submit to an
evaluation, since it is not something they normally consider
before reporting a crime. 6 1 To the contrary, adult victims
certainly consider the humiliation involved in reporting a rape, if
not the actual possibility of a psychological examination. 62 While
children may not understand the ramifications of reporting a
crime, they usually do not call the police on their own; they tell a
trusted adult.63 Concerned parents may indeed choose not to
57

See David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System,

87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1195 (1997) (noting that rape victims often do

not come forward to report their rapes because they fear the justice system at every
level, from being interrogated by overbearing police to facing vicious character
attacks should the case go to trial).
58 See Mark D. Yochum, The Death of a Maxim: Ignorance of the Law Is No
Excuse (Killed by Money, Guns and a Little Sex), 13 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT.
635, 635-37 (1999) (outlining the argument that since ignorance of the law is no
excuse for committing a crime, laws must be clear so they can serve as effective
deterrents).
59See Berger, supra note 1, at 12-14 (providing an excerpt of a crossexamination in a rape trial where the complainant was grilled in order to determine
whether the alleged rape was in fact consensual sex). In the past, some states held
resistance by the victim to be a statutory element of rape, effectively meaning the
victim had to do enough to fight off the rapist to prove she had been raped. Id. at 8;
see also David J. Giacopassi & Karen R. Wilkinson, Rape and the Devalued Victim, 9
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 367, 369 (1985) (noting that rape was the only crime whose
elements required such extreme resistance).
60 Patricia Yancey Martin & R. Marlene Powell, Accounting for the "Second
Assault": Legal Organizations'Framing of Rape Victims, 19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
853, 856 (1994) (citing data wherein women who went ahead with rape prosecution
had more psychological trauma six months after the rape than those who chose not
to prosecute).
61 See Abbott v. State, 138 P.3d 462, 469 (Nev. 2006); In re Michael H., 602
S.E.2d 729, 734 (S.C. 2004).
62 See State v. Fortney, 269 S.E.2d 110, 116 (N.C. 1980). See generally Fiona E.
Raitt & M. Suzanne Zeedyk, Rape Trauma Syndrome: Its Corroborative and
Educational Roles, 24 J.L. & SOC'Y 552, 555 (1997) (listing the emotions felt by
victims immediately after a rape, including fear, humiliation, and embarrassment).
63 In most of the cases cited in this Note, the child victims told their parents
first. See, e.g., Abbott, 138 P.3d at 465 (describing how the victim allegedly ran into
her mother's room to tell her that her step-father had touched her private parts
immediately after the incident); In re Michael H., 602 S.E.2d at 730 (explaining how
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report a crime if they feel that their children will be subjected to
psychological examinations, perhaps causing their child to dwell
on the issue, even for years after the initial trauma. 64
Forcing a victim-especially a child-to undergo an
evaluation suggests to that person that "the law" assumes they
are lying. This is a dangerous idea for victims who already tend
to feel dejected, humiliated, and who often suffer from low selfesteem. 65
Institutionalizing-and thereby confirming-the
victim's fears by compelling psychological evaluations will thwart
the prosecution of past and future sex offenders. It is notable
that in California, the number of victims reporting rapes has
more than doubled since the statutory ban on Ballardmotions in
1981, suggesting that there was indeed a deterrent effect when
66
the motions were allowed.
Furthermore, even when a victim chooses to report a crime,
an order to compel an examination may deter him or her from
continuing with the case.
If the choice is to submit to a
psychological examination and testify or do neither, many
victims will select the latter. 6 7 Without such testimony, the case
may not be able to go forward-the victim is often the sole
witness of a sex crime. 68 Psychological examinations are even
more likely to cause this outcome than physical examinations,
because the need for the former is understood less by the public
as normally incident to a rape prosecution as, for instance,
69
collecting DNA evidence.
the victim's mother explained to him what rape was after they watched a news
story, prompting him to tell her that his uncle had "done that to me before").
64 See Jane Dever Prince, Competency and Credibility:Double Trouble for Child
Victims of Sexual Offenses, 9 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 113, 128 (2004).
65 See Tom Luster & Stephen A. Small, Sexual Abuse History and Problems in
Adolescence: Exploring the Effects of Moderating Valuables, 59 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
131, 133 (1997) (finding that victims whose mothers believed their sexual abuse
stories were less likely to suffer from depression).
66 See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., CAL. OFFICE OF ATT'Y GEN., CRIMES
1952-2004, at 100-01 tbl.1 (2004), http://caag.state.ca.us/cjsc/publications/candd/
cd04/tabs/1.pdf.
67 See People v. Mills, 151 Cal. Rptr. 71, 74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that
orders to compel do not force victims to be evaluated, but simply open them up to
sanctions, including not being allowed to testify).
68 See Troy Andrew Eid, Comment, A Fourth Amendment Approach to
Compulsory Physical Examinations of Sex Offense Victims, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 873,
876 (1990).
69 DNA evidence is usually collected at the time the crime is reported. See
Martin & Powell, supra note 60, at 884-85 (describing how police officers take
victims to the hospital to collect evidence).
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It is important to distinguish psychological evaluations from
physical examinations, as some commentators argue that the
harm to a victim's dignity caused by the former pales in
comparison to that of undergoing a physically invasive
examination. 70 Such physical exams, however, possess benefits
that psychological evaluations do not; they also avoid the harm
inherent in psychological examinations. Some medical experts,
for example, find that a post-rape examination benefits a victim
by ensuring that proper treatment for injuies as well as
prophylaxis against sexually transmitted diseases and pregnancy
are obtained. 7 1 Additionally, the physical examination is less
likely to insult the victim and to create feelings of low self-esteem
and humiliation, because its purpose is not to test the victim's
truthfulness, but rather to collect the evidence required for
conviction.7 2 For many victims, the lingering feelings caused by
the sexual assault are worse than the assault itself, so a
psychological examination could exacerbate the most traumatic
part of the experience.
Victims are a cog in the wheel of the criminal justice system;
only through their coming forward and participating in the
process can a criminal be prosecuted and all ends of justice be
served. It is in society's best interest, then, to protect the sexual
assault victim's dignity, both because the victim is benefiting
society and because this encourages others to report these kinds
of crimes. Of course, protecting a victim's dignity is important
not only for the purpose of promoting prosecution, but also due to
the trauma it can cause an individual victim. 7 3 Unlike a civil
plaintiff, the complainant in a criminal case will not directly
benefit from its outcome through the awarding of damages.
While civil cases implicate personal matters between two parties,
criminal cases involve condemnation by society at large. 74 A
victim thus benefits society by reporting rape, almost always at a

70 See Greenberg, supra note 4, at 1261. But see Eid, supra note 68, at 873-74
(arguing that even physical examinations should not be compelled by courts).
71 See Martin & Powell, supra note 60, at 885.
72 See id.
73 See United States v. Benn, 476 F.2d 1127, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("[The
trauma that attends the role of complainant to sex offense charges is sharply
increased by the indignity of a psychiatric examination.").
74 See Nathan Roth, Factors in the Motivation of Sexual Offenders, 42 J. CRIM.

L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 631, 632-33 (1952).
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great personal cost. 75 And the conviction of a guilty rapist is
particularly good for society, since rapists and child molesters
76
typically exhibit high recidivism rates.
C.

The Victim's Right to Privacy

Sound public policy requires that a victim feel comfortable
throughout a prosecution, from reporting the crime to testifying
at trial. 77 Psychological examination is not often-if ever-an
issue in the prosecution of offenses like assault and battery the
way it is in a rape case.78 This suggests that courts agree with
Wigmore's assertion that there is something inherently
unreliable about a person who reports a sex crime.7 9 The
75 See generally United States v. Dildy, 39 F.R.D. 340, 343 (D.D.C. 1966)
(discussing the trauma and embarrassment a complaining sexual assault witness
undergoes on the state's behalf).
76 See Eric S. Janus & Paul E. Meehl, Assessing the Legal Standard for
Predictions of Dangerousness in Sex Offender Commitment Proceedings, 3 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 33, 40 (1997).
77 Consider this passage from the well-known Susan Estrich article, Rape:
Did I realize what prosecuting a rape complaint was all about? They tried
to tell me that "the law" was against me. But they didn't explain exactly
how. And I didn't understand why. I believed in "the law," not knowing
what it was.
I learned, much later, that I had "really" been raped. Unlike, say, the
woman who claimed she'd been raped by a man she actually knew, and was
with voluntarily. Unlike, say, women who are "asking for it," and get what
they deserve. I would listen as seemingly intelligent people explained these
distinctions to me, and marvel; later I read about them in books, court
opinions, and empirical studies. It is bad enough to be a "real" rape victim.
How terrible to be-what to call it-a "not real" rape victim.
Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1088 (1986).
78 See Ballard v. Superior Court, 410 P.2d 838, 848-49 (Cal. 1966) (stating that
motions to compel are applicable only in sexual assault cases), superseded by statute,
1980 Cal. Stat. 63 (codified as amended at CAL. PENAL CODE § 1112 (West 2007)), as
recognized in People v. Haskett, 640 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1982). There is a notion that
complainants in rape cases are somehow "special" and different from complainants
in other criminal cases. Lack of consent is the essence of what criminalizes rape, so
historically, elements of force and lack of resistance have come to be a part of rape
law, causing it to be more victim-focused than crimes such as assault. See Berger,
supra note 1, at 7-8. Some courts, however, are trying to move away from this notion
that rape victims are inherently different. See Gilpin v. McCormick, 921 F.2d 928,
931 (9th Cir. 1990) (disagreeing that the testimony of children is inherently
unreliable); People v. Davis, 283 N.W.2d 768, 769 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) ("Credibility
is an issue in every case, and there is no showing beyond Dean Wigmore's outmoded
psychological theories that sex offenses warrant greater scrutiny of the
complainant.").
79 See supra note 8.
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potential damage of that view is more than just an affront to a
single complainant's personal dignity-it can have severe societal
repercussions.
It was not long ago that rape victims were
practically treated as criminals by society,80 and there still
8
remain some similarly negative attitudes today. '
In making the rape victim feel comfortable about bringing
charges, the right to privacy is paramount. An order to compel
an evaluation has been found to be a "drastic" infringement on
this right, with potential repercussions for a witness's reputation
and career.8 2 And while an adult may refuse an examination 83subject to certain sanctions that will make it difficult to bring a
case 4-child victims in protective custody may be unable to
decide for themselves.8 5 This outcome is inconsistent with the
fact that the right to privacy has been held fundamental by the
86
Supreme Court.

80 Having "resistance" be an element of rape puts undue focus on the victim,
causing her to feel like she has been put on trial. See Berger, supra note 1, at 8;

supra note 59 and accompanying text.
81 When basketball star Kobe Bryant was arrested on a rape charge, society
condemned not Bryant, but the prosecutor and the alleged victim, whose name and
address were posted on the internet, which resulted in at least two people being
charged with death threats against her. See Alice Vachss, The Charge of Rape, the
Force of Myth, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2003, at B02. Those in support of Bryant pointed
out that he was married to a beautiful woman, was a good basketball player, and
that he seemed "nice." Id. People have trouble believing a beloved celebrity could
commit a violent crime. See Peter Arenella, People v. Simpson: Perspectives on the
Implications for the Criminal Justice System: Foreword: O.J. Lessons, 69 S.CAL. L.
REV. 1233, 1236 (1996); Megan Reidy, Comment, The Impact of Media Coverage on
Rape Shield Laws in High-Profile Cases: Is the Victim Receiving a "FairTrial'?, 54
CATH. U. L. REV. 297, 330-32 (2004) (suggesting that celebrity defendants have an
advantage because they can bias the juror pool in their favor by portraying
themselves in a positive light and using the media to attack the victim). In order to
uphold the defendant as innocent in a case like Bryant's, where DNA evidence
proved that there was intercourse between him and the complainant and a
gynecological examination showed signs of force, the defendant's supporters must
then place the onus on the victim-for example, by arguing that the forcible entry
was caused by sex with another man around the same time as consensual sex with
Bryant occurred, which tends to portray the victim as promiscuous and feeds into
the notion that "slut[s] cannot be raped." See Vachss, supra.
82 See State v. Looney, 240 S.E.2d 612, 626 (N.C. 1978).
83 See United States v. Rouse, 111 F.3d 561, 567 (8th Cir. 1997).
84 See Looney, 240 S.E.2d at 627 (noting that a witness who refuses a
psychological examination may not be permitted to testify).
85 See Rouse, 111 F.3d at 567.
86 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (finding that privacy is
a right inherent in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments).
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THE BAN WOULD NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS

The Court Has No Explicit Power to Compel
The defendant does not have the right to a compulsory
psychological examination of a complaining witness because
there is no such definitive power vested in the courts. Some
courts, in fact, reason that in the absence of a statute specifically
creating such authority, it is wrong to assume that such power
exists.8 7 These states operate under the belief that a carefully
worded statute would allow for more protections for victims, 8 8 so
their courts do not have the discretionary power to grant such
requests. Other courts posit the alternative: Since no statute
specifically disallows the practice, judges indeed have the
discretion to grant such motions.8 9 The federal statute proposed
in this Note would be a substantial step toward uniformity by
disallowing the practice in every federal court throughout the
United States.
Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that
"[t]he court where the action is pending may order a party whose
mental or physical condition ...is in controversy to submit to a
physical or mental examination... ."90 This rule obviously has

A.

87 See Wedmore v. State, 143 N.E.2d 649, 654 (Ind. 1957) (holding no power or
authority to compel); State v. Horn, 446 S.E.2d 52, 53 (N.C. 1994) ("[A] trial judge
has neither statutory authority nor discretionary power to compel an unwilling
witness to submit to a psychiatric examination."); see also United States v. Dildy, 39
F.R.D. 340, 342 (D.D.C. 1966) ("But when the witness refuses to submit to such
examination, there is 'a great dearth of authority' affording the court the power to
compel her.").
88 See Looney, 240 S.E.2d at 627.
89 Cf. Forbes v. State, 559 S.W.2d 318, 320 (Tenn. 1977) (noting that no statute
authorizes examinations in the state, yet finding that there is a power to order one
for compelling reasons).
90 FED. R. Civ. P. 35(a). The full text reads:
Rule 35. Physical and Mental Examination of Persons
(a) Order for an Examination.
(1) In General. The court where the action is pending may order a
party whose mental or physical condition-including blood group-is
in controversy to submit to a physical or mental examination by a
suitably licensed or certified examiner. The court has the same
authority to order a party to produce for examination a person who is
in its custody or under its legal control.
(2) Motion and Notice; Contents of the Order. The order: (A) may be
made only on motion for good cause and on notice to all parties and the
person to be examined; and (B) must specify the time, place, manner,
conditions, and scope of the examination, as well as the person or
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no bearing on motions to compel in criminal cases, 91 and there
are very good reasons why no analogous power exists in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 92 Unlike in the civil
context, a complaining witness or victim in a criminal case is not
a party. 93 This is a very important distinction since a party to a
civil action can generally drop or settle the case if an
examination is ordered and he or she is too uncomfortable with
complying. Complaining witnesses in criminal sexual assault
cases, on the other hand, can be sanctioned for lack of
compliance; sanctions include having to pay fines, 94 having the
jury informed of their refusal and thus allowing it be considered
in deliberations, 95 being held in contempt of court, 96 and having
their testimony held inadmissible. 97 Because of these serious
consequences, courts should not be able to order examinations
without express statutory authority.
B.

The Ban Poses No ConstitutionalProblems
A ban on compulsory examinations would not abridge any of
a defendant's constitutional rights. The Fifth Amendment Due
Process and Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights can
be upheld even without granting defendants this tool for
discrediting complainants. 98 In passing a ban, Congress would
persons who will perform it.

Id.
91 See Dildy, 39 F.R.D. at 342.
92 Id. (suggesting that the lack of such power "bespeaks an intended omission").
93 State v. Little, 861 P.2d 154, 159 (Mont. 1993) (holding that victims cannot be
compelled into either medical or psychological evaluations because they are not
parties); see also Gilpin v. McCormick, 921 F.2d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1990).
94 See Greenberg, supranote 4, at 1267.
95

Id.

96 See United States v. Proffitt, 498 F.2d 1124, 1130 (3d Cir. 1974).
97 See State v. Looney, 240 S.E.2d 612, 627 (N.C. 1978).
98 Additionally, the fact that the vast majority of sexual assault cases involve
male defendants and female complainants, see Buddie, supra note 5, at 1,would not
in itself make the statute prejudicial towards men and thus implicate the Equal
Protection Clause. See People v. Armbruster, 210 Cal. Rptr. 11, 13 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985). In California, for example, the ban to enforce examinations was enacted "to
ameliorate an intolerably invasive discovery practice utilized principally, if not
exclusively, in the prosecution of sex offenses." Id. at 13 (perceiving no arbitrariness
in the enactment of said statute). In light of how easily Ballard motions were
granted in some instances in California, it would be fair to say-in that state at
least-that the equal protection rights of victims forced to undergo examinations
were more thoroughly compromised than those of criminal defendants when such
motions were denied. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
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send a strong message that, while a defendant's rights are
important, they will not be favored to the exclusion of those of a
victim.
1.

Procedural Due Process

Proponents of compulsory psychological evaluation argue
that because the penalties for sex crimes are so steep, 99 there
should be especially stringent rules meant to protect a
defendant.1 00 Federal courts have gone in the opposite direction,
however, focusing more on victims' rights. Even Federal Rule of
Evidence 413-which makes evidence of a sexual assault
defendant's history of similar offenses admissible 10-survives
Fifth Amendment scrutiny.10 2 A Fifth Amendment due process
argument implicates protection against rules that deprive
defendants of "life, liberty, or property." 10 3 The right to assess a
victim's credibility through a judicially-compelled psychiatric
examination is hardly fundamental to protecting these rightswhile courts indeed must take the utmost care to protect
innocent defendants, rape accusations are no more likely to be
fabricated than accusations of any other crime.10 4 As such,
federal caselaw demonstrates that a psychological evaluation of1 a5
complaining witness is not required by the Fifth Amendment,
and that the denial of a motion to compel does not implicate a
"'fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of
justice.'

"106

99 The death penalty for rape of an adult woman was held unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
100 See Abbott v. State, 138 P.3d 462, 470 (Nev. 2006).
101 FED. R. EVID. 413(a). Character evidence is not generally admissible "for the
FED.
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion ....
R. EVID. 404(a).
102 United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1433 (10th Cir. 1998); see also
Francis P. King, Rules of Evidence 413 and 414: Where Do We Go from Here?, 2000
ARMY LAW. 4, 8.
103 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005).
104 See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 57, at 1195.
105 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... ). This Fifth Amendment right is applied
to states via the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. Federal
courts have held that compulsory psychological examinations are not necessary for
constitutional due process. See Gilpin v. McCormick, 921 F.2d 928, 931 (9th Cir.
1990).
106 United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 872 (1982) (quoting
Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941)) (creating a standard for denial of
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Typical cross-examination is sufficient to weed out dishonest
108
witnesses. 10 7 The jury is the ultimate judge of credibility.
Although expert witnesses are generally not allowed to testify
directly as to whether a complainant is lying, they can testify as
to whether they believe that a complainant was sexually
assaulted or whether a child victim is competent to understand
the oath-both of which have the functional effect of telling the
jury that a complainant is lying. 10 9 The witness oath and crossexamination are still powerful tools that aid the jury in making
110
its determinations.
There are additional solutions that preserve defendants' due
process rights without subjecting complainants to the harms of
Availability of prior medical or
compelled evaluations.
psychological
records
can
render independent
witness
evaluations unnecessary.'
Furthermore, where a victim
suffered from previous mental problems, the court can admit the
11 2
testimony of an expert with personal knowledge of the victim.
This is a reasonable compromise, given that it rests on a
foundation of demonstrating the pre-existence of mental
11 3
competency issues.
due process); see also United States v. Rouse, 111 F.3d 561, 568 (8th Cir. 1997)
(holding that declining an order to compel is not an abuse of discretion that meets
the standard).
107 But see In re Michael H., 602 S.E.2d 729, 734 (S.C. 2004) ("[Clrossexamination of a complainant who is incompetent to testify, a condition that could be
established through a psychological evaluation, would be wholly ineffective in
protecting a defendant's right to a fair trial. A complainant who is incompetent to
testify may not fully understand or convey the implications of his or her
psychological condition on cross examination.").
108 See People v. Davis, 283 N.W.2d 768, 769 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979); State v.
Looney, 240 S.E.2d 612, 627 (N.C. 1978) ("'The jury is the lie detector in the
courtroom.'" (quoting United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 (1998))); State v.
Walgraeve, 412 P.2d 23, 24 (Or. 1966) (holding that the Ballard court's concerns
that the jury's province to evaluate the credibility of witnesses would be
compromised by having the expert witness who did the evaluation testify as to
credibility were valid, and affirming the denial of a motion to compel).
109 See Prince, supra note 64, at 122-23.
110 See People v. Michael M., 162 Misc. 2d 803, 808, 618 N.Y.S.2d 171, 176 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County 1994).
111 See State v. Garay, 453 So. 2d 1003, 1006 (La. 1984).
112 See People v. Baier, 73 A.D.2d 649, 650-51, 422 N.Y.S.2d 734, 735-36 (2d
Dep't 1979).
113 See Commonwealth v. Shearer, 894 A.2d 793, 795 (Pa. 2006) ("[A] courtordered psychological examination should never be the starting point for such a
determination."); Commonwealth v. Alston, 864 A.2d 539, 548 & n.4 (Pa. 2004)
(holding that the record must establish a credibility issue before an evaluation can
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Proponents of independent evaluations argue, specifically in
cases involving children, that it helps to identify those most
susceptible to suggestion. 114 They reason that a child who is
asked the same question more than once may feel pressure to
give a "new" or different answer the second time. 11 5 This logic
begs the question as to why having another examination, ordered
by the defendant, would not make children susceptible to
believing that they gave the wrong answers in previous
A better approach, then, is to allow expert
evaluations.
witnesses to testify as to childrens' susceptibility to suggestion,
letting the jury decide whether the child witness in fact told the
truth.1 1 6
This would shield the defendant from victim
suggestibility while also protecting the victim from an
evaluation.
2.

Confrontation Right

The Sixth Amendment right to confront an accuser would
similarly not bar a federal law against compulsory
examination." 7 The complainant still has to testify and submit
to cross-examination, so there is adequate opportunity for
confrontation without forcing an examination.1 18 The purpose of
the Confrontation Clause is not to give criminal defendants free
reign to exploit every possible angle for discrediting a witness,
but rather to ensure that the jury has the opportunity to see a
witness, judge a witness's demeanor, and assess a witness's
credibility." 9 Thus, when the defense is arguing that a child
victim has been unduly influenced, it is sufficient to question the
child about such influence during cross-examination and
1 20
question the persons who have allegedly influenced the child.
Even where the psychological examination would give the
defense information useful for purposes other than assessing a
be ordered).
114 See Bloom, supra note 6, at 42-45 (describing suggestive procedures that
may taint a child victim's testimony).
115 See id. at 43.
116 See People v. Michael M., 162 Misc. 2d 803, 809-10, 618 N.Y.S.2d 171, 177
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1994).
117 See U.S. CONST. amend VI.
118 See Gilpin v. McCormick, 921 F.2d 928, 932 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that
cross-examination is enough to satisfy the right to confront); Bangle & Haage, supra
note 16, at 985-86 (distinguishing psychiatric evaluation from cross-examination).
119 See Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419 (1965).
120 See State ex rel. Holmes v. Lanford, 764 S.W.2d 593, 594 (Tex. App. 1989).
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victim's credibility, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held
that it is not necessary to compel examination under the Sixth
Amendment.121
An analogy is properly drawn between the law proposed in
this Note and rape shield laws, which protect victims from
intrusion into their sexual history. 122 In Virgin Islands v.
Scuito,123 the Third Circuit stated that to compel a victim to
submit to an evaluation actually comes close to violating Rule
412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the federal rape shield
law.1 24 The court affirmed an earlier decision holding that an
evaluation would violate the "spirit" of Rule 412.125 The Rule
states, in pertinent part, that neither "[e]vidence offered to prove
that any alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior" nor
"[e]vidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual
predisposition" shall be admissible "in any civil or criminal
While
...
126
proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct.
evidence of a victim's sexual history could be construed as
admissible under other Rules, 127 public policy reasons-including
121 See Gilpin, 921 F.2d at 932 (upholding the lower court's decision denying the
motion that would allow defendant's attorney to confront victims with evidence that
they did not suffer Rape Trauma Syndrome in order to strengthen the defendant's
argument that no rape ever occurred).
122 See State v. Clontz, 286 S.E.2d 793, 796-97 (N.C. 1982) (holding that it
would be against the public policy inherent in the rape shield statutes to allow
unnecessary intrusion into the victim's privacy in the form of a compelled
psychological evaluation).
123 623 F.2d 869 (3d Cir. 1980).
124 Id. at 874; see also FED. R. EVID. 412.
125 Scuito, 623 F.2d at 875; State v. Fortney, 269 S.E.2d 110, 116 (N.C. 1980)
("Part of the reluctance of victims to report and prosecute rape stems from their
feeling that the legal system harasses and humiliates them.").
126 FED. R. EVID. 412(a)(1)-(2). The exceptions to this are the following:
(A) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim
offered to prove that a person other than the accused was the source of
semen, injury or other physical evidence;
(B) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim
with respect to the person accused of the sexual misconduct offered by the
accused to prove consent or by the prosecution; and
(C) evidence the exclusion of which would violate the constitutional rights
of the defendant.
FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1).
127 The Federal Rules of Evidence permit the accused to raise pertinent
character traits about the victim. Since the definition of "relevant" in the Federal
Rules is very lenient, consisting of evidence having any tendency to make a fact
probable, the fact that a woman has ever consented to sex in the past could be
considered relevant on the issue of whether she consented to sex with a defendant.
See FED. R. EVID. 401. But see Orenstein, supra note 3, at 684 (suggesting that since
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protecting the victim from degradation, humiliation, and unfair
prejudice-took precedence in the enactment of Rule 412.128 For
these reasons, the Rule has survived attacks by critics who
believe it violates the Sixth Amendment. 129
Rape shield statutes are not the only laws designed to
protect the privacy and dignity of witnesses. Criminal records of
130
witnesses are not discoverable for purposes of impeachment.
As to the issue of witness credibility, lie detector tests are largely
inadmissible. 131
In 1990, Florida passed a law prohibiting
evidence of the clothing a victim was wearing when raped, 132 in
response to a Georgia case in which the jury acquitted a
defendant who allegedly raped a woman at knifepoint-because
the victim supposedly "asked for it" by wearing a miniskirt and
tank top. 133 The above demonstrates that there are occasions
when legislatures should justifiably intervene on behalf of
victims' rights; rape defendants would certainly prefer to be able
to submit evidence of a victim's promiscuity or sexualized
wardrobe, 3 4 but this does not mean that their rights are
compromised when lawmakers limit such evidence. Allowing
compelled examinations to assess credibility undermines the
import of such beneficial legislation.
CONCLUSION

There is no need for the law to render bringing a rape case
especially difficult or discouraging for the victim-contrary to
men are not fungible, such evidence has little probative value).
128

412).
129

See Orenstein, supra note 3, at 684 (presenting the justifications for Rule

See, e.g., J. Alexander Tanford & Anthony J. Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield

Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 544, 545 (1980) (arguing that
some rape shield laws are unconstitutional).
130 See United States v. Riley, 657 F.2d 1377, 1389 (8th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Taylor, 542 F.2d 1023, 1026 (8th Cir. 1976).
131 Martin & Powell, supra note 60, at 881 (pointing out that they are only
admissible in court when both the prosecution and defense stipulate to it, which is
rare). Some prosecutors, however, use them to assess victims' credibility in deciding
whether to go ahead with the case. Id. This is yet another example of how the justice
system demonstrates an institutionalized skepticism of sexual assault victims. Some
law enforcement officials report feeling anger at complainants whose lies may come
to embarrass them in court, and one reported threatening alleged victims with jail
time as soon as they report a rape. Id.
132 See id. at 854 n.1.
133
134

See id. at 854.

Jurors were "repeatedly" shown the "sexy" outfit over the eight-day trial. Id.
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popular belief, false reports of rape do not have a higher
incidence than false reports of other crimes. 135 The ethics
charges against and subsequent disbarment of the prosecutor in
the recent Duke rape case for withholding exculpatory
evidence 136 may undermine the public's faith in this fact, but
such cases are newsworthy because they are the exception, not
the rule. 137 As society slowly comes to realize this, the law is
moving toward increased legislation that protects the dignity of
sexual assault victims.
Motions to compel are gross invasions of complainants'
privacy-they send a distorted message that a defendant's rights
are more important than those of a victim. A federal statute
banning this practice would be a progressive act, reinforcing the
policy interest in protecting the dignity and privacy of crime
victims. That these motions generally arise only in sexual
See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 57, at 1195.
The North Carolina State Bar filed a complaint against District Attorney
Michael B. Nifong for making "improper commentary" and engaging in "dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." See David Barstow & Duff Wilson, Prosecutorin
Duke Sexual Assault Case Faces Ethics Complaint from State Bar, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
29, 2006, at Al. The full 17-page complaint can be viewed on the internet.
TheSmokingGun.com, Ethics Rap for Duke Prosecutor, http://www.thesmokinggun.
com/archive/years/2006/1228062barl.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2008). Nifong was
disbarred on June 16, 2007. See Duff Wilson, Judge Says He Will Suspend Durham
ProsecutorImmediately, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2007, at AO.
137 Society generally does not say that victims are probably lying when they say
they were attacked in a non-sexual manner, or that they should have resisted more,
even though false charges of rape are comparable to false charges of other violent
crimes, with about two percent of cases proving false. See Morrison Torrey, When
Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions,
24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013, 1028 (1991). That many rape cases do not go forward all
the way to prosecution--often because of victims being deterred by fears of
humiliation and harassment, something the federal ban advocated by this Note
seeks to reduce by example and in practice-may confuse the public and lead them
to believe that more rape victims are liars than the evidence suggests. Id. at 102829. In the Duke case, even before the evidence of Nifong's dishonesty was made
public, but after a physical examination of the victim-an exotic dancer-revealed
evidence consistent with blunt force trauma, Jonathan D. Glater & Duff Wilson,
Files from Duke Rape Case Give Details but No Answers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2006,
at Al, media pundits like Rush Limbaugh and Tucker Carlson referred to the
complainant as a "hoo" and a "crypto-hooker," Lynne Duke, The Duke Case's Cruel
Truth; Hateful Stereotypes of Black Women Resurface, WASH. POST, May 24, 2006, at
C01, suggesting that as a stripper, the woman consented to sexual relations simply
by entering the private party held by the Duke lacrosse team. Though these pundits
may have felt vindicated when the Nifong ethics charges came to light, such
attitudes are extremely harmful to society, and evidence laws can reduce them. See
Orenstein, supra note 3, at 664 ("[E]ven the procedural law of evidenced affects how
rape influences the general tenor of social belief.").
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assault cases promotes harmful attitudes about victims that
further alienate and deter them from reporting crimes. Instead
of continuing to allow such harm, the federal government-and
hopefully every state, in turn-should embrace the enlightened
attitude evident in State v. Looney: "We perceive no sound basis
for distinction, in this matter, between cases involving sex
offenses and cases involving other crimes, between male and
female witnesses, youthful and adult witnesses, complaining
witnesses and other witnesses, witnesses for the State and
138
witnesses for the defendant."'
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240 S.E.2d 612, 626 (N.C. 1978).
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